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Disentangling the Performance and Entrenchment 
Effect of Family Shareholding:
A Study of Indian Corporate Governance*
Manoranjan Pattanayak 
CRISIL Limited
Using an econometric framework, we examine the nature of relation between Tobin’s Q and 
family shareholding in India. While there is no obvious causality laid down by theoretical 
literature, empirical evidences show a wide range of findings. In the present work, by 
controlling for a host of factors, we document a non-linear relation between family share 
holding and firm value. In the literature, the issue of endogeneity problem is highlighted in the 
context of ownership-performance relation. We address this concern via the instrumental 
variable regression method. Even though the curvilinear aspect of the relation between firm 
value and insider share remain intact in all of the specifications, our model statistics do not 
trace any endogeneity problem in the data.
Introduction
Ownership is a critical factor that influences firm performance. However, the 
influence is moderated by a host of factors like ownership type and ownership concentration. 
Consider an extreme case where shareholding is fragmented and individual investors own 
1 / AT'* of the company. Contrast this with a sole proprietorship firm owned by Mr. Alex. 
While Mr. Alex bears the costs and enjoys the benefits accrued in the course of firm’s 
operation, in the former type of firm the outcome whether good or bad is shared by many in 
proportion to their share-holding amount. The monitoring activities in a largely held firm 
therefore bears ‘public-goods’ characteristics. Unless altruism is the overruling law of the 
society, the ‘Homo economicus’ would maximize individual welfare function at the cost of 
some activity that would fetch larger societal welfare.
± The author would like to thank Manoj Pant, Amp Mitra and participants of Indian Econometric Society 
conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. However, views expressed in this paper are strictly 
personal.
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In case of a corporation, the cost and benefit of an individual investor is linked to 
his/her proportional share ownership. Unless it is substantial, every investor would take the 
‘free-rider’ route. Moreover, if the investor enjoys disproportionate power vis-a-vis his/her 
shareholding amount, then siphoning of resources to other entities where he/she has higher 
stake cannot be ruled out. Emerging economies are marred by umpteen market failures and 
regulatory inefficiencies. In such cases, concentrated ownership may prove to be beneficial 
for investors and society at large (La porta et al., 1999). In this study, we explore the vaUdity 
of the statement where concentrated family shareholding is the dominant form of firm 
governance.
Notwithstanding the significance of this issue, there are limited evidences of the 
relation between ownership and performance in India. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999) find a U- 
shaped relation between director’s shareholding and firm value. In a follow-up study (2000) 
they largely document a positive relation between higher director shareholding and firm 
value. Khanna and Palepu (1999) do not find any significant impact of Director’s (i.e., 
Managers) shareholding on firm value. Kali and Sarkar (2005) find that interlocking 
directorate, debt commitment and concentrated promoter share are the most important factors 
for the superior performance of group firms. Selarka (2005) finds a U-shaped relationship 
between insider/promoter’s shareholding and market to book value ratio. Most of these 
studies have ignored the temporal dynamics of the relation and based on small sample size. 
Moreover, since many of them have focused on large firms, the heterogeneous characteristic 
of sample size is lost which is very vital for governance studies.
In this study, we develop a large panel data set using 1833 firms for years 2001-2004. 
Besides overcoming issues related to sample size and type, we have controlled for any 
temporal or cross-sectional shocks. Tobin’s Q and other market based measures are used as 
performance parameter. The shareholding of ‘founding family’ or ‘promoter’ is the key 
explanatory variable as we propose to examine the nature of relation between family 
shareholding and firm-value. Indian family shareholding is disguised in the name of 
promoters in the company reports. ‘Promoter’ is one of the ill defined terms in the Indian 
company law. Sections like 62, 69 and 478 of The Companies Act, 1956 use the word 
promoter just to impose liability without much elaboration of the term. However, Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in its 1995 Malegam Committee Report and in the 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers regulations, 1997 has provided a working 
definition of promoter. Broadly, “Promoter” is perceived as a person who brings about the 
incorporation and organization of a corporation and retains the overall control power of the 
company. The immediate relative of the promoter, among others, form the promoter group.
In this paper, promoter’s share is taken as the share of insiders or the combined share 
of family. For example in case of Reliance Limited -  which is the largest firm in terms of 
market capitalization in India, share of promoters would mean share of Ambani families -  a 
reasonable approximation of family holding in Indian context. The estimated relation shows 
that family shareholding has significant impact on firm value. However, the relation is not 
linear in nature which means there is no direct proportional relation between family 
shareholding and firm value. Firm value first increases, then decreases and subsequently 
increases with further rise in family shareholding. Further we have tried to estimate the exact 
break point of this relationship. While the break points are changed with every alternate 
specification in case of polynomial equation, the grid search approach in a spline estimation 
technique have fetched some unique break points. We find family holding and Tobin’s Q to
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be positively related when shareholding amount is less than 20 percent. Between 20 to 49 
percent the relation is found to be negative and it turns to be positive beyond 49 percent.
We first describe (Section-I) the econometric issues involved in the estimation of the 
relationship between firm value and family/insider shareholding. Section II then delineates the 
theoretical argument involving insider shareholding and firm value. Data and empirical 
specifications are described in section III. Regression results are discussed in sections IV and
V. Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Some Econometric Issues
It is the most intricate task to develop a model that would satisfy each statistical 
criterion while providing accurate theoretical predictions. Often the choice to employ a model 
depends on the availability of timely information in the real world which is scarce. Precisely 
that is one of the key reasons why econometrician sometimes violates the prescriptions of 
econometric theory. However, the best one can do is to avoid large specification errors. In 
ownership and performance studies, there are several econometric problems like a) 
endogeneity/reverse causality b) missing variables c) sample selection bias d) variable 
measurement errors. In addition, the functional form debate i.e., shape of the relationship of 
ownership-performance, is not yet been resolved.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s (henceforth MSV, 1988) work is the first of its kind in 
which they use a piecewise linear estimation technique to make evident the incentive and 
entrenchment effect in a managerial ownership-performance study. Their model can be 
generalized as:
Y^ = a ^ ^ - PJ ^ x ^ ^ + 0 ^ z ^ ^ + . . .  + 6pZ.p+e^, where z,. is an ownership variable and 
in z.j to z.p, 1 to shows the number of knots or spline nodes. The spline variables 
are constructed in the following manner:
st
1 spline = z^., if z^ . <
= P[, otherwise 
2 ^^ spline z^ y = 0 , if z/<Py_l
= Z i ~ P j - \ ,  if Pj - \<Zi<Pj , ' ]=2, . . . . ^- \
= Pj-Pj-X,ifPj<Zi 
spline z/p = 0 , if z /< P p _ l
= z^ . -  Pp-\-> otherwise
The piecewise linear relation is assumed to have P  ^break points. Here, the number 
of breakpoints has to be pre-determined. To decide the breakpoints often people have relied 
on the institutional structure of respective countries. The advantage of the above method is 
that regression line is continuous at the different spline node that is unlikely in case of slope 
dummy methods. The slope dummy method does not require the various segments to meet at
the joint points.
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As pointed out earlier there are numerous studies which have used quadratic or 
polynomial regression model to study the ownership-performance. The Polynomial regression 
model can be specified as:
Y.=ai + + ... +  + O^ z. + + £*.
One of the advantages of such specification is that the turning points are determined 
empirically thus limiting the arbitrariness. However, there are certain disadvantages like - the 
turning points are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of other control variables, turning points 
may be inconsequential in nature thereby not helping in policy studies/formulation. It may not 
fit the data well if the nonlinear relationship is not smooth. Finally, it restricts any kind of 
comparison with previous studies by providing new break points with each set of control 
variables.
Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
and many others have used simultaneous equation model to study the ownership-performance 
relation. Whenever the relationship is two-way apphcation of OLS will give biased estimator. 
A simple simultaneous equation model could be written as:
Y.^  =  dfj Pik^ ik
Yi2 =  Ofj + ^ 2yn
Y
If one estimates the first equation ignoring the fact that ig endogenous, then the 
estimator will be biased and inconsistent i.e., they do not approach the true values of the 
parameter as sample size increases. Reverse causality or endogeneity is an important concern 
in corporate governance studies as several studies documented that performance and 
ownership are endogenous variables. Despite a strong theoretical linkage between 
concentrated ownership and firm performance, there is a potential causality that runs fi*om 
performance to ownership for better performing firms. If this argument holds then OLS 
regression would suffer from simultaneous-equation bias. Similarly, if there are some 
unobserved factors, which influence ownership and performance that are left out then the 
estimated coefficient of managerial ownership will only reflect a spurious correlation, not a 
causal relationship (Himmelberg et al, 1999). Formally, the argument may be stated in the 
following way:
z = j3x + € .  x  =  y z  +  T] where ^ (£ -) =  ^ ( 77)  =  0 and C o v (f,7 7 ) =  cr^
Where ^ denotes firm performance and ^ ownership concentration. If we estimate
p ^ p + c o v { x , e ) /  
the first equation by OLS, we obtain / ^^^(-^)
When we simplify c o v { x , s )  replacing the value of-*, it turns out to be -
cov{x,e) = cov{yz+r],£) = co^{'y{Px+e)+T1,e] = ycTl+ Pycov{x,£)+a^
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cov{x,e)-P ycov(x,e) = ycy] + a ^ ,c o v {x ,E \\-P y )  = and
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cov{x,e) =
or cr^ TtO, the estimated coefficients p  will be biased and inconsistent. The
first is true in case of structural reverse causality, the second if common unobserved factors 
are present. Cho (1998) has tried to address the former type of problem whereas Himmelberg 
et al.(1999) have addressed the later type of problem. The case for using fixed effect approach 
lies with the later type of problem. However, fixed effect approach is severely criticized as it 
does not explain variation between firms. Moreover, there may be unobserved factors which 
vary over time as a result fixed effect estimators will be biased and inconsistent. In many 
cases, variation between firms is important to know as it will show which firm specific 
arrangements improve performance.
The missing variable phenomenon is also important in corporate governance studies as 
each study is directed to achieve certain limited objectives. There are several governance 
mechanisms like ownership structure, capital structure, board Structure, management 
compensation, product market competition and market for corporate control. It is difficult to 
incorporate all aspects of governance in a single equation; paucity of adequate information 
further makes it a formidable task. Therefore, empirical studies are prone to have biased 
coefficient estimation. Apart from that the other defect arises on account of sample selection. 
Often researchers consider large and listed firms for corporate governance studies. However, 
these firms are not randomly selected rather selection is influenced by few endogenous 
variables such as firm performance indicators. Very often large and better performing firms 
prefer to go public. As long as the sample is censored on the basis of left-hand dependent 
variable, the estimated coefficient will be biased. This is a major problem suffered by most of 
the studies.
II. Ownership-Performance: What the theory says
Theoretical prediction on ownership and performance relation is not uniquely 
identified. The causality flows in both the direction i.e., from ownership to performance and 
vice-versa. However, none of the theoretical reasonings are insignificant in nature. We 
elaborate a few of them in the following paragraphs.
The convergence of interest or incentive alignment argument states that firm 
performance is an increasing function of insider share ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The separation of ownership and control creates an agency conflict. The agency cost 
will be limited if the owner-manager holds substantial amount of share in the firm. The 
logical concomitant of this h)^)othesis is that there is a ‘steady positive relationship’ between 
management or insider ownership and corporate value. With increased stake, managers or 
insiders pay a larger share of the cost of deviation from value maximization and are therefore 
less likely to squander corporate wealth. Hence, agency costs and management ownership 
would be negatively related.
The reward argument predicts a positive relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance. This suggests that firms reward their managers with equity ownership for 
their strong past performance (Kole, 1996). This statement has implication for causality and 
timings of ownership and performance variables. For example, now the relationship is of
nsLtrnQ: O wnership, = f  (P erfo rm a n ce ,whereas the incentive alignment argument predicts
that Performance, = /{Ownership,).
Cho (1998) has stated that ‘other things being equal, managers may prefer equity 
compensation when they expect their firm to perform well and consequently the value of the 
firm to increase. As a result, higher levels of insider ownership are expected at firms with 
high corporate values’. Cho’s prediction is fundamentally different from Kole’s argument so 
far as timing is concerned because Kole emphasizes the relationship between past 
performance and present ownership whereas Cho predicts the relationship between expected 
performance and current ownership. Therefore, we can express the relationship as 
Ownership, = f  (Performance!^^) whQYQ Performance!^  ^\s corporate performance at time t+1 
as expected at time t. On the other hand, Kole’s argument implies 
ihdiXOwnership, = f  (Performance,^^).
The second line of argument predicts a negative relationship between insider 
shareholding and firm value. When insiders equity stake in the firm is not substantial and 
shareholders are too dispersed to take action against non-value maximization behavior, 
insiders may deploy corporate assets to obtain personal benefits, such as shirking and 
perquisite consumption. Also as Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out, 
insiders holding a substantial portion of a firm’s equity may have enough voting power to 
ensure that their position inside the company is protected. As a result, they may become to a 
great extent insulated from external disciplining forces such as the takeover threat or the 
managerial labor market. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (MSV, 1988) have named this as 
entrenchment effect. However the question arises if the insider is the majority owner, then as 
per incentive ahgnment thesis he/she should endeavor to maximize profit. But, isn’t it too 
much generalization of managerial/insider behavior? The manager may become increasingly 
less motivated by money as his wealth increases. Things such as ‘power’, ‘prestige’, ‘empire 
building’ may be equally or possibly more important for an extremely wealthy person.
There is another strand of argument which holds the relation to be cyclical or 
undulating. Stulz (1988) has developed a formal model where he has presented an inverted U- 
shaped relation between management ownership (through voting rights) and firm 
performance. It is stated that value of the firm is positively related to voting rights when 
voting rights is small and vice-versa. Firm performance tends to rise at each increment in 
managerial share at the beginning. However, it falls and reaches its minimum when the 
manager/insider holds more than fifty percent share in a firm. To note Stulz’s analysis 
revolves around the takeover premium argument. The basic argument is that insiders with 
higher levels of ownership are positioned to oppose takeover threat from the market. 
Therefore the acquirer has to pay higher takeover premiums to increase the likelihood of the 
success of the takeovers. But, with higher levels of managerial ownership the possibility of 
successful takeover diminishes and therefore firm performance starts to decline after a 
sufficiently high level of ownership. Firm performance reaches its minimum when insider 
shareholding is around fifty percent in the firm because with majority ownership the chances 
of successful takeover become dim.
In a sharp contrast to all of the above reasoning, Demsetz has argued ownership 
structure is an endogenous outcome of several competitive processes thereby denies any 
linkage between managerial ownership and firm performance. Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Kole and Lehn (1997) have argued for such
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kind of relationship. Their basic argument is that ownership structure with insufficient 
performance will fail to survive in the long run. Demsetz (1983) has put a strong criticism 
against Berle and Means (1932) thesis that an inverse correlation exist between diffuseness of 
shareholdings and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argued that the 
ownership structure of a firm is an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence 
of shareholders and of stock market trading. The ownership structure that emerges, whether 
concentrated or diffused, is influenced by profit maximizing interest of the shareholders, so 
that there is no systematic relationship between variation in ownership and performance.
While there is no convergence in theoretical argument, the empirical evidences 
support each strand of argument. One of the important dimensions which seem to receive 
scanty attention is the institutional structure of the country. The country’s suprastructure 
defines the broad governance mode of every micro unit of the country. Ownership as an 
important incentive mechanism operates within the boundary set by the law and regulations of 
the country. While incentive is the driver for any economic activity, its strength is critically 
linked to broad provisioning and enforcement of law. Therefore, while viewing any country- 
specific findings, one should juxtapose it with the economic and legal development in the 
respective countries.
III. Data and Empirical Specifications
The initial sample consists of 1,833 listed firms obtained from Prowess database 
maintained by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Most of the firms are listed in 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange (NSE) -  the two largest stock 
exchange of India. For each firm we have four years of observation i.e., 2000-01 to 2003-04. 
Out of a large panel we have eliminated firms for which a) sales b) shareholding pattern and 
c) selected stock indicators like share price and market capitalization are missing. The sample 
is a mix of large and small firms. Previous well-known studies like MSV (1988), Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), have collected sample from Fortune 500 list. One criticism 
against all these studies is that since the relation between a governance mechanism and 
performance may depend upon firm size, a perfect sample should be heterogeneous in terms 
of size. We have taken care of this problem by including both large and small firms in the 
sample.
The dependent variable in the regression model is Tobin’s Q which is defined as the 
ratio of the market value of a firm plus the market value of its debt—to the replacement value 
of the net fixed assets of the firm. Since market value exhibit the discounted present value of 
its expected future income stream, it is undoubtedly a forward measure of firm performance.
Q ratio taking into account the future prospects of the firm provides a measure of 
management’s ability to generate certain income stream from an asset base (Short and 
Keasey, 1999). The higher is the Tobin's Q, the more is the market value of the firm.
We have used two methods -  a) a cubic (polynomial) equation method b) Spline 
method. The primary specification is:
Tobin's Q.^  = a + p(ownership) + yX.^  +6^ ->rS^  +
The ownership.^ variable measures the fraction of the equity of firm i, lying between 
zero and one, which is owned by insiders in period t. The control variables X.^  are firm 
specific factors. In the model, industry specific fixed effects are S., time effects 6^  and a 
random unobserved component . To introduce non-linearity in the model, we have used the
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polynomial function of insider ownership such as (ownershipf.^,{ownershipy.f . Each
explanatory variable is described'm. Appendix 1.
As mentioned earlier such formulation has certain disadvantages because of which we 
have introduced a piecewise linear regression model. It is called piecewise linear as it is pre­
supposed that ownership has one linear effect on Q-ratio within a certain range of its values, 
but a different linear effect, at a different range. This model allows for changes in slope, with 
the restriction that the line being estimated is continuous -  that is it consists of two or more
straight line segments. In a cubic or quadratic model, the slope changes continuously with 
variable but in piecewise linear specification, the slope is same or constant in a particular 
segment. The model with spHne specification which is adopted here is as follows:
Tobin's Q ,= a + m N S .S P \ \+  p,{lNS.SP2)+P,{INS.SP,) + rX ,+ d ,+ 5 ,+ e ,,
INS.SP represents a spline node. We have generated three spline variables of insider
ownership containing two knots at 0.20 and 0.49. More formally, let ^
variables to be created i-lv jH -l corresponding knots, and INS (insider share) be
the original variable. Then,
Z/VS'i =rmn(INS,k^) and/TVS'. =max{min(/A^*S',A:.),^^_i}-A:._i where i=2,...,n
The marginal spline specification is defined as
/JVS. =/JVSand/ArS,=max(0,/Ar5-^,_.) where spe^.ifi,ation is preferred
as the generated variables when used in estimation, its coefficient represent the change in the 
slope from the preceding interval. For example, INS.SP2 in the marginal specification shows 
the change in slope fi*om after insider ownership 0.20 to before insider ownership 0.49. 
Therefore, it tests for the differences in slopes. In non-marginal spline specification, INS.SP2 
would have measured the slopes for the interval i.e., 0.20 to 0.49. Another advantage of 
marginal spline specification is that it makes possible to test whether the change in slope is 
significant, i.e., if the effect of INS.SP2 is not significant then the effect of insider ownership 
does not change after the break point. Hence in the final specification we include three 
marginal spline variables.
The knots at [0-20], [0.20-0.49] and above are finalized after extensive search at 
different threshold level. Also, the decisions are influenced by the break-points which are 
obtained from the polynomial estimation. Morck et al. (1988) have categorically stated that 
the knots are arbitrary in nature. Given the criticism, we have tried to link the knots to Indian 
property right’s regime which is discussed later in the paper.
IV. Empirical Findings
Table I to IV report the estimate of the determinants of firm value as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q. The different models are designed to address many econometric issues such as 
specification bias, omitted variable bias, spatio-temporal effects, outlier problem, robustness 
of the result and endogeneity problem. Model 1 reports results from a baseline specification 
using pooled data for all firm-years. Model 2 to 4 is the augmented pooled data estimates 
while in Model 5 & 6 we have taken 4-year average of each variable. In the parenthesis, 
below each coefficient, we report the heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
The basehne specification confirms the curvilinear hypothesis that the relationship 
between performance of firms and insider ownership is cubic in form. The coefficient of the
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variables INS and INS3 are positive while the quadratic term is negative. This result provides 
evidence for the general functional form of the relation between Tobin’s Q and insider 
ownership - that management move from alignment, to entrenchment, to alignment as their 
ownership stake in the firm increases. Below each model, we provide p-value of F-statistics 
for the joint hypothesis that all the three of the insider ownership coefficients are jointly zero 
(i.e., joint exclusion test). For model-1, the P-value is 0.00 that rules out the null hypothesis.
In figure 1, we plot the predicted Tobin’s Q and Insider share. The graph shows that, 
corporate value increases with insider ownership but begins to decline at higher levels of 
ownership. Finally, corporate value increases at a very high level of insider ownership. This 
finding is in conformity with convergence of interest and entrenchment effects at increasing 
levels of insider ownership. Higher amount of family stake in the firm persuades the members 
to do better monitoring activities that results in higher market value. When we have calculated 
the tuming points for this baseline specification, the turning points are found at 0.29 (maxima) 
and 0.56 (minima) point of insider ownership.
This finding suggests that insiders in India entrench themselves at a very high level of 
ownership. In general we see in advanced countries, managers entrench at very low levels of 
share ownership (MSV, 1988). This difference in findings could be attributed to institutional 
differences between emerging economies and advanced countries. Several studies 
documented that Ovmership in US is less concentrated (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Roe, 
2005; La Porta et al., 1999). Highly diffused ownership structure enables the manager or 
insider to entrench at low level of share-holding as non-insider shareholdings are diffused 
(MSV, 1988). Second, as MSV (1988), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), have 
collected sample from Fortune 500 list i.e., large firms, it is not surprising to see managers to 
entrench at low level of ownership because major block holdings will be absence in such 
firms. However in India ownership is highly concentrated. The concomitant governance 
structure allows insiders to entrench only at a higher level of ownership.
Model-2 is augmented by introducing many control variables and it is also controlled 
for temporal shocks. The sign and significance of ownership variables remain unaltered. 
Further the result shows a convex non-linear impact of firm size (i.e., sales) on firm value. 
Firm value (Q-ratio) first decreases and then increases in log of sales (Isales) which is 
consistent with the curvilinear findings of Himmelberg et al.(1999). Whether economies of 
scale or organizational efficiency (X-efficiency) is the reason for positive association of value 
and size for large firms require a more scientific investigation. In our earlier study (Pant and 
Pattanayak, 2005), we find the absence of scale economies in Indian industry. Therefore, 
intemal capital market advantages and organizational efficiency of large firms could be the 
reason for higher Q-ratio.
Leverage or debt intensity is positive, as the point estimate is 0.63 with high statistical 
significance. To test for non-linearity, the model-2 includes a squared leverage term which is 
found to be positive and statistically significant. A high commitment of fixed debt payment 
helps in alleviating the excess cash flow problems. This is also consistent with the signaling 
argument (Ross, 1977) and free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986). For US firms, while MSV 
(1988) and Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) show a negative influence of debt on firm value, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive impact
Next, the coefficient of R&D intensity is positive and statistically significant. R&D 
expenditure is a soft spending and insiders have informational advantage vis-a-vis outsiders. It 
may involve managerial private benefits. The positive estimate suggests that higher spending
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in R&D leads to higher Q-ratio. The point estimate of advertising or promotional expenditure 
is 0.06, which is statistically significant at less than 1 percent level. Advertising expenditure 
captures the effect of intangible assets along with R&D expense. Higher expenditure in 
advertising helps firm in building reputation and acts as entry deterrence for the new entrants 
in the industry.
It is observed that lesser is the capital intensity (K/S) of firms, higher is the value (Q- 
ratio). Himmelberg et al. (1999) find an inverse U-shape relationship between capital intensity 
and firm value where as Habib et al. (2003) show a U-shape relation between firm efficiency 
score and capital intensity. When we include in model-2, the squared term of capital intensity, 
not only both the coefficient became insignificant but also we observe the turning point in the 
U-shape curve at 2737.28 that is much beyond the capital intensity ratio in sample firms (the 
maximum value in our sample is 1866). Hence, we submit capital intensity has a linear 
negative effect on firm value in India. Theoretically, a greater investment in tangible fixed 
assets is easy to monitor, thus, alleviates the fear of managerial moral hazard. Similarly, firms 
with higher amount of intangible capital may be subject to greater agency problems as capital 
providers cannot observe, monitor and assess spending on intangibles easily. However, firms 
operating with higher proportions of intangible assets may adopt a strict governance structure 
to signal investors that they want to prevent the future misuse of resources (Klapper and Love, 
2002).
Stock market liquidity is a major concern in emerging economies. The scrips that are 
traded frequently shall command higher price in the market. The coefficient of liquidity 
confirms that companies whose stock turnover is high tend to have higher market value. The 
final variable in model-2 is BSE 500, a categorical variable equal to 1 if the firm is Bombay 
Stock Exchange 500 (BSE-500) firms. It is akin to Fortune-500 firms globally. In the sample, 
there are 353 BSE-500 firms (70.6 percent of BSE-500). In addition, once a firms name 
appears in BSE-500, investors’ confidence level on that firm increases that translates into 
higher stock price. Whenever such kinds of firms come with additional issues, it generally 
gets oversubscribed. BSE-500 firms are much larger in comparison to non-BSE 500 firms. 
Thus, to test the quality and size effects we include BSE-500 categorical variable in the 
model. As expected, the dummy variable is turned out to be positive and highly significant. 
On an average, the market value of BSE-500 firms is 41 percent more in comparison to non- 
BSE 500 firms.
In Model-3, we include another categorical variable i.e.. Foreign presence 
(FORPRES). If the promoter shareholding includes share by foreign promoter/collaborator. It 
is coded as one, otherwise zero. Foreign promoter/collaborator viewed as strategic partner for 
domestic corporations when specifically, they share superior technological expertise. The 
technological and organizational advantages of foreign firms and their ability to operate 
intemationally bring reputational advantages vis-a-vis domestically owned firms. In the 
sample there are 345 firms with foreign promoter/collaborator shareholding. The categorical 
variable shows that firms with foreign promoter share tend to have higher market value.
To test the effect of devolution of property rights to foreign promoters/collaborators, 
we have generated two categorical variable i.e., FORS: 26-51 percent and F0RS>51 percent 
where the reference category is less than 26 percent of foreign promoter shareholding. Both 
the dummy variables have positive sign with high statistical significance. The size of the 
estimate is large when foreign promoter shareholding is more than 51 percent. This provides 
evidence that foreign promoter shareholding is beneficial for other investors.
114 PisentanslinQ the Performance and Entrenchment Effect, .. (Pattanayak)
Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Welch 
(2003), in model 5 and 6, four years (i.e., 2001-2004) average of each variable are taken. In 
model-5, the sign of INS & INS3 is positive while the sign of INS2 is negative. The turning 
points are observed at 0.29 (maxima) and 0.53 (minima). It is observed that the coefficient of 
INS3 is at least twice of coefficient of INS. This suggests high powered incentives by way of 
increased share ownership raises effort that influences firm value positively.
To avoid possible spurious correlation between ownership and Q-ratio through 
industry effects we have used 2-digit industry dummy based on National industrial 
classification (1998) which is akin to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). We have not 
reported the intercept as each industry gets its own intercept. There is an ongoing debate in 
governance studies -  whether to control for firm level fixed effects or at the industry level. 
Using firm level fixed effects is problematic as it removes all cross-section variation that is 
important in the present study. Firm specific dummy variables eliminates all between firm 
variations fi-om the data. It only exploits the within group variation in the data as the mean 
demeaning procedure eliminates between variation. Since the cross-sectional variation is 
important in governance studies, we prefer industry dummy rather than firm level dummy 
variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Zhou, 2001). Zhou (2001) argues that Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) could not find any link between ownership incentives and firm performance as 
fixed effects of firm remove all cross-section variation.
Model-7 in Table-II is the replication of model-1 of Table-1 that does not include any 
control variables. As per hypothesis, the sign of INS and INS  ^ is positive and sign of INS  ^ is 
negative. It confirms the previous findings that insiders move from alignment, to 
entrenchment to alignment as their ownership stake increases in the firm. All the ownership 
variables found to be jointly significant. Here, the turning points are found at 0.30 (maxima) 
and 0.52 (minima). Model-8, 9 and 10 is the replication of model-2, 3 & 4 with industry fixed 
effects. In case of Model-10, the value of maxima is observed at 0.32 of insider ownership 
and minima at 0.52.
Following Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (MSV, 1988) we adopt a piecewise-linear 
model to exactly identify the non-monotonicity in the relation between insider stock 
ownership and firm performance. This model allows for the effect of holdings to change at 
different threshold points known as spline nodes. In the present work, we choose the knots at 
[0-0.20], [0.20-0.49] and above 0.49. As MSV (1988) state, such type of chosen nodes has 
some arbitrary elements. However, to limit the discretion and to derive policy implications, 
we have attempted to link the spline nodes with Indian property rights regime as per 
Companies Act, 1956 (See, Appendix-2). First two models in Table-3 are presented for a 
comparison purpose with the subsequent two models of this table. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) 
find in a cross-sectional study that firm value decreases up to 25 percent of managerial 
shareholding and increases thereafter. To test that, in model-11 we have created two knots at 
[0-0.25] and above. Unlike Sarkar et al., we find the coefficient of both insider variables to be
positive and insignificant.
Indian property rights regime is defined in such a way that when shareholding level is 
less than 26 percent, one cannot block special resolutions. As shareholdings go beyond 26 
percent, one can stop the passing of a special resolution. A special resolution requires the 
support of 3/4th majority of shareholders present and entitled to voting as per section 189 of 
Indian Companies Act, 1956. When the shareholding level exceeds 50 percent, one can pass 
ordinary resolutions, which govern most of the activities of the firm. Thus varying degrees of
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control power is associated with each level of ownership stake, thus one can expect its effect 
to be exhibited in firm performance. Accordingly we have generated three spline nodes at [0- 
0.26], [0.26-0.51] and above in model-12. As one can see in the model, the sign of each 
ownership variable is as per expectation i.e., INS.SPl and INS.SP3 is positive and INS.SP2 is 
negative. However, none of the ownership variables is significant at the conventional level of 
significance. Only INS.SF3 shows to be significant at 10 percent level.
In model-13 & 14, the spline nodes are fixed at [0-0.20], [0.20-0.49] and above. We 
have selected the cutoff point after extensive search at several points, including the turning 
points that are emerged in the cubic estimation. In the cubic model, we find the values of 
maxima to vary fi*om 0.28 to 0.32 and the values of minima to vary from 0.45 to 0.54. But, the 
spline specification best fits in the aforementioned range. To state here 0.49 is only 0.02 point 
less than 0.51 where one gets simple majority. Therefore, once insider has 49 percent or more 
shareholding in the firm, it is enough for them to collude with some small stakeholders to 
block special resolutions as and when the situation demands.
The baseline specification model-13 does not include any control variables and like 
earlier tables we report the heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics below each estimated 
coefficients. As per hypothesis of the study, we find the firm value to increase when insider 
stake is less than 20 percent and beyond 49 percent but it declines in the range of 20 to 49 
percent. In model-14, all of the explanatory variables are included. The sign and significance 
of each ownership coefficient is consistent with the previous findings. For each 1 percent 
increase in ownership between 0 and 20 percent, firm value increases by an average 0.005 and 
for each 1 percent increase in ownership from 20 percent to 49 percent, firm value declines by
0.007 points. As we have taken marginal spline specification, the coefficient shows the 
change in the slope from the preceding intervals. Instead of change in slope, if one wants to 
get the actual slope of INS.SP2, one has to add coefficient of INS.SPl and INS.SP2. 
Similarly, to get the slope of INS.SP3, one has to add the coefficient of INS.SPl, INS.SP2 
and INS.SP3. After getting the actual slope, we divide it by 100 to give percentage 
explanation since each ownership variable is in decimal.
V. Endogeneity Problem
There are two kinds of endogeneity problem discussed in the governance literature. 
First, the problem of reverse causality i.e., ownership and performance influences each other 
(Cho, 1998). Second, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity i.e., ownership may be 
endogenous because of individual heterogeneity affecting both firm value and its ownership 
structure (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Cho (1998) argues that managers would like to be 
compensated through equity when they expect the performance of firms to increase. In other 
words, performance of firm influences the ownership stake of managers. In addition, incentive 
alignment argument predicts the performance of firms to increase with increment in 
managerial holdings. In the presence of this mutual interdependence, OLS will give biased 
and inconsistent coefficients. Similarly, if there are certain unobserved factors which 
influences both ownership and performance, and omitted from value equation, the resulting 
estimates will be biased. This will happen as the ownership variables in the value equation 
will be correlated with the error term of the model i.e., ^ 0 .
In India, as per employee stock option plans (ESOP, section 17 of the Income Tax 
Act, 1961; SEBI Regulations, Indian Companies Act, 1956 sec.79 A), an employee is given 
the option to acquire shares of the company at a pre-defined discount price after a certain
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period. It is open to all permanent employees and to the directors of the company. However 
an employee who is a promoter or belongs to the promoter group shall not be eligible to 
participate in the scheme. Also, a director who either by himself or through his relative or 
through any body corporate, directly or indirectly holds more than 10 percent of the 
outstanding equity shares of the company shall not be eligible to participate in the scheme. In 
addition, under employee stock purchase plan (ESPP) company offers shares to employees as 
part of a public issue or otherwise. In this plan, large shareholders and promoters are not 
allowed to take part. In this study, we have taken promoters’ shareholding as insider or family 
holding. Therefore, deflnitionally they cannot participate in any of such schemes. This 
partially rules out the first concern of endogeneity that is interdependence of performance and 
stock reward. Other than that, Stiglitz (1994) has given a political-economy argument of 
exogenous relationship of ownership-performance in an emerging economy. He articulated 
the exogenous relationship on the basis of illiquid capital market in less developed economies. 
Since in emerging economy the capital market is less than perfectly liquid, it is difficult for 
investors to trade and change ownership structure in response to changing condition.
The next problem is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. To solve this problem, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use lagged ownership variables as instruments for managerial 
ownership. Himmelberg et al.(1999) use Isales, Isales  ^ and sigma as the instruments. 
However, Himmelberg et al.’s (1999) FV-variables are subject to criticism as they use these 
same variables as the predictors of Q-ratio in their previous models.
In Table-IV, we present the IV-model estimates of Tobin’s Q on insider ownership 
and other control variables. In Model-15, we take lagged ownership variables as instrumental 
variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Gugler and Weigand, 2003; Muller and Spitz, 
2002). Like previous models, the coefficient of INS and INS  ^is positive and INS  ^is negative. 
Each ownership variable is statistically significant at conventional level of significance. In the 
last row of the table, we present two tests of endogeneity of regressors. The null hypothesis of 
the test is that an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the same equation would yield 
consistent estimates; that is any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious 
effects on OLS estimates (Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 2003). As the P-value suggests, one 
could not reject the null hypothesis here. Thus, it rejects the assumption of endogeneity of 
regressors that is insider ownership variables are not endogenous variables. The equation is 
exactly identified because there are three endogenous variables and three instrumental 
variables.
In Model 16, we introduce two more instrumental variables i.e., p  (market risk) and 
its S.Ep (firm risk). The p  coefficient is obtained through a regression of weekly returns of
firm on weekly return of sensex (BSE sensitive index) for each year. The standard error 
obtained from the regression is used to estimate firm risk (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Welch, 2003). is a commonly used measure to assess the volatility of returns relative to a 
benchmark index. A stock with a P  higher than one has higher risk than the average company 
in the market; while a P  below one is associated with lower risk. As managers are risk 
averse, a negative relation is expected between firm risk and insider ownership (Himmelberg 
et al., 1999). On the other hand, greater is the instability in the firm’s environment, higher is 
the opportunity for managerial discretion. Therefore, Demsetz et al., (2001) predicts a positive 
relationship between risk and ownership.
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In model-16, all the ownership variables possess the expected sign and significance. 
Though it holds the basic hypothesis of convergence of interest and entrenchment, the model 
is rejected on the basis of Wu-Hausaman F test given in the last row. The P-value shows that 
one can not reject the null at conventional level of significance which imply the regressors are 
not endogenous. Model-17 & 18 is estimated by error component two stage least square 
model introduced by Baltagi (1995, ch-7). As random effects estimator is a weighted average 
of the between and within estimator, likewise error component two stage least square 
estimator (ec2sls) is a weighted average of two stage least square estimation of a between 
estimator and two stage least square estimation of a within estimator. Each insider ownership 
variable in model-17 & 18 is statistically significant and bears the expected sign. Model-17 
uses the lagged ownership variables as instruments while model-18 includes two more 
instrumental variables i.e., P  andS.^'^.
VI. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the influence of insider shareholding on firm 
value. It is well known that in a typical Indian firm average stake of insiders is more than fifty 
percent. That clearly negates the separation of cash flow rights and control rights and the 
ensuing agency problem. However, that poses a new problem which is prevalent in Asian 
economies known as ‘large investor activism’. This paper is an attempt to disentangle the 
performance and entrenchment effect of dominant shareholder in Indian firms.
Our examination supports the non-linear relation between insider shareholding and 
firm value. The interest alignment effect works at very low and extreme high level of insider 
shareholding, while entrenchment effect is operative in medium range of insider shareholding. 
We argue that when family shareholding is not substantial, they are unable to entrench 
themselves. However, when their stake increases and in the range of 20 to 49 percent, the 
force of market mechanism becomes weak and allow the insiders to exercise their 
discretionary power. Their incentive to consume at office or divert resources to the entity 
where they have exclusive ownership increases. But, what happens when insiders become the 
major shareholder in the firm? We find that as and when insiders’ stake exceeds 49 percent, 
there is a realignment of interest with the firm. On account of majority stake in the firm, they 
stand to bear the maximum loss for each dollar forgone. As per the monitoring hypothesis, 
with greater ownership, insiders keep an eye on other constituents of the firm and the firm 
gets rid of the free rider problem associated with dispersed ownership. Therefore, our 
conjecture is that unlike other Asian countries, concentrated ownership in Indian firms has not 
posed a systemic major challenge so far.
This study also confirms another hypothesis that is presence of foreign promoter in a 
firm and their amount of shareholding has a positive impact on firm value. This may be due to 
reputational effect of foreign promoter’s shareholding in a firm. Investors may perceive 
foreign promoters shareholding as an indicator of firms’ quality. Unlike previous studies, this 
study finds that foreign promoter shareholding has a positive impact on firm value at each 
threshold limit of shareholding. But, the effect becomes more pronounced when foreign 
promoter shareholding exceeds 51 per cent in the firm. These findings provide support to the 
ongoing reform program in India and calls for a complete removal of sect oral foreign direct 
investment cap.
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Figure 1
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Table I




















DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q
POOLED DATA AVERAGE OF 2001-2004
MOD-1 MOD-2 MOD-3 MOD-4 MOD-5 MOD-6
1.1574 0.7751 0.7227 0.9326 1.2309 1.0206
(3.60)* (2.53)“^ (2.36)* (3.07)* (1.87)** (1.74)**
-3.0371 -1.9550 -1.9466 -2.4861 -3.2338 -2.5602
(-3.81)-^ (-2.56)* (-2.55)* (-3.30)* (-2.06)* (-1.80)**
2.3769 1.7023 1.6932 1.9950 2.5926 2.0218
(4.03)=^ (2.99)* (2.98)* (3.55)* (2.28)* (1.92)*
-0.0604 -0.0635 -0.0631 -0.0842
(-4.81)* (-5.03)* (-5.04)* (-3.26)*
0.0071 0.0074 0.0073 0.0101
(3.42)* (3.59)* (3.60)* (2.41)*
0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0018
(1.55)§ (1.70)** (2.05)* (1.63)**
- 0.6270 0.6402 0.6828 0.8536
(10.77)* (11.22)* (12.22)* (10.57)*
0.0988 0.0913 0.0863 0.0801
(2.84)* (2.73)* (2.67)* (2.27)*
4.6277 4.5609 4.5621 5.6383
(5.15)* (5.08)* (5.15)* (3.07)*
- 0.0623 0.0618 0.0566 0.0702
(2.30)* (2.34)* (2.33)* (1.65)*
0.0381 0.0417 0.0443 0.0365
(1.76)** (1.84)** (1.88)** (0.63)
-0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008
(-1.99)* (-2.38)* (-2.38)* (-1.14)
-0.0275 -0.0290 -0.0348 0.0023
(-2.10)* (-2.21)* (-2.66)* (0.10)




















R-square 0.0046 0.2109 0.2170 0.2297 0.0518 0.3291
F Stat: Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prob>F: (insider)# 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
Year dummy: NO Yes Yes Yes Ind. Dummy Ind. Dummy
Obs. 7329 7305 7305 7305 1830 1826
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance a t 15 percent level.
^ for models P-value of Joint exclusion test of insider ovjnership is given; for which the null hypothesis is 
all the insider-ovi/nership variables are jointly Zero.
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Table II



























DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q 
































































































Adj. R-square 0.0336 0.2288 0.2344 0.2470
F Stat: Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prob>F:(insider)# 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year dummy: No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7329 7305 7305 7305
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance a t 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance a t 15 percent level.
#  for models P-value of Joint exclusion test o f insider ownership is given; for which the null hypothesis is 
all the insider-ownership variables are jointly Zero.
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Table III




















DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q 
Industry Fixed Effects 











































































































Adj. R-square 0.2453 0.2455 0.0389 0.2458
F Stat: Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prob>F:(insider)# 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year dummy: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7305 7305 7329 7305
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using 
White's heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix.
* indicates significance at 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance a t 15 percent level.
#  for models P-value of Joint exclusion test o f insider ownership is given; for which the null hypothesis is 
all the insider-ownership variables are jointly Zero.
@ Model-11 is the replication ofSarkar and Sarkar's (2005) i.e., [0-0.25] & above.
$ Model-12 is adopted following India's Corporate Law or Legal regime where certain control rights 
devolve at [0-0.26], [0.26-0.51 ]  and above.
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Table IV




















DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOBIN'S Q 
IV-2SLS Regression EC2SLS








































































































































Adj. R-square 0.2689 0.2690 0.2526 (overall) 0.2499 (overall)
F Stat: Prob > F 0.00 0.00 Prob > chi2:0.00 Prob > chi2;0.00
Year dummy: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5476 5471 5476 5471
Mstrumented Ins, Inssq, Inscu Ins, Inssq, Inscu Ins, Inssq, Inscu Ins, Inssq, Inscu
Instruments L.ins, L.inssq, L.inscu L.ins, L.inssq, L.ins, L.inssq, L.inscu L.ins, L.inssq,
L.inscu,Beta,Se L.inscu,Beta,Se
Tests of Endogeneity: a)0.2628 a)0.21327
a)Wu-Hausman F
test:Prob>F:
b)Durbin-Wu-Hausman b) 0.2578 b) 0.20861
chi-sq test: Prob>chi-sq:
Notes:
t-statistics are in Parentheses in model 15 & 16 and z-statistics are in parenthesis in model 17 & 18.
* indicates significance at 5  percent level, ** indicates significance at 10 percent level, § indicates 
significance a t 15 percent level.





Tobin's Q Tobin's Q or Q 
Ratio
(Market Value of Equity + Preference Capital+ Total 
Borrowing)/Book Value of Assets
Insider'
Ownership Share
INS Share of founding family/insider. In the estimation, it is 
used in a 0 to 1 Scale
Square of Insider 
Share
INSSQ Square of Insider Share i.e., (INS)^
Cube of Insider 
Share
INSCU Power three of Insider Share i.e., (INS)^
First Spline of 
Insider Share
INS.SPl Unless otherwise Mentioned, it is up to 0.20
Second Spline of 
Insider Share
INS.SP2 Unless otherwise Mentioned, it is up to 0.49
Third Spline of 
Insider Share
INS.SP3 Unless otherwise Mentioned, above 0.49
Foreign Presence FORPRES A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if there is 
foreign Promoter share w ithin Promoter/Insider Share, 0 
otherwise.
Foreign Share<26% FORS<26% A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign 
Promoter share within PromoterAnsider Share is less 





FORS:26-51% A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign 
Promoter share within Promoter/Insider Share is more 
than or equal to 0.26 and less than 0.51, 0 otherwise.
Foreign Share>51% FORS:>51% A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if foreign 
Promoter share within Promoter/Insider Share is more 
than or equal to 0.51, 0 otherwise.
Other Variables of Interest
Sales, Sales Square LN(Sh LN(Sy I) Natural Logarithm of Sales. II) Natural Logarithm of 
Sales Square
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Operating Income Y/S





















Cash Profit/Sales.(Cash Profit: This is the profit derived 
by adding the non cash charges such as depreciation and 
amortization to the profit after tax.)
Unless otherwise stated, It is Long term 
Borrowings/Total Assets (To avoid simultaneity and 
endogeneity, we have taken one period lag of Leverage)
Aggregate Research and Development 
Expenditure/Gross Fixed Assets
(Advertising Exp. +Marketing Exp. +Distribution 
Exp.)/Gross Fixed Assets
Expenditure in Acquiring New Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed 
Assets
Gross Fixed Assets/ Sales
Natural Logarithm of Age.(Age=2004 -  Year of 
Incorporation)
365 days Average Trade quantity of Stocks/Total Shares 
outstanding
A categorical Variable, that is, equal to 1 if the Firm 
belongs to BSE-500 list, 0 otherwise.
Estimated Beta Coefficient
SE(S.E^) Se Standard Error of Beta
128 Disentanglins the Performance and Entrenchment Effect.., (Pattanayak)
Appendix 2 
Shareholding levels and authority
SHAREHOLDING AUTHORITY
< 10 % Can prevent acts which are ultra vires the co. or illegal. Can approach Central
Govt, to sue management for oppression of minority shareholders or 
mismanagement of the co.
> 10 % Can sue management for oppression of minority shareholders &
mismanagement of the co.
> 25 % Can block special resolutions -the passing of which requires prior notice to be
given to members, and votes cast in favor be at least 3 times the votes cast 
against.
> 50 % Can pass an ordinary resolution — which govern most matters and inter alia
covers:
> adopting the annual accounts
> matters relating to the capital structure of the company
> issues relating to the appointment of auditors and their remuneration
> issues relating to the appointment of directors including the managing 
director, their remuneration and permission for exercise of certain powers
> matters associated with the voluntary winding up of a company 
> 7 5 %  Can pass a special resolution, some of the decisions requiring which are:
> Change in the memorandum and articles of association of the co.
> Approval for the commencement of a new business
> Alteration of the rights of holders of special classes of shares
> Specific issues in the w inding up of a co.
100% Total control of the company
Source: Rao and Biswal (2003)
